Before Pakistan could start recovering from a suicide bombing at a U.N. office in Islamabad and a massive bomb blast in a Peshawar market last week, the brazen October 10 attack targeting Pakistan’s most secure military complex — Army Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi, just a few miles from the capital of Islamabad — jolted it further.
This was neither the first attack on an army structure in the country nor the most deadly — but it is unprecedented given the extent of the breach of the GHQ security, the confusion that it created in its initial stage (raising concerns about the safety of army chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani), and its timing vis-à-vis the planned launch of a ground military operation in South Waziristan. It could be a transformational event for the army — cementing its resolve against local militants, bridging internal divisions and forcing a review of its intelligence estimates. However, jumping to conclusions without a thorough investigation and reacting rashly based on preconceived notions would be highly counterproductive. Additionally, though Pakistan’s nuclear installations are not in the immediate vicinity of GHQ, the nature of the attack raises questions about how security agencies would react if a future attack targets any of the nuclear weapons facilities.
To understand how the Pakistani Army will view this developing situation, three other factors are also very relevant. Effective military operations in Swat have taught the army that ‘a stitch in time saves nine’ and that without public support no military campaign can succeed. Additionally, Indian allegations about the Pakistani Army’s direct involvement in every attack on its personnel and interests in Afghanistan help those extremist elements in Pakistan who see India and Pakistan clashing on every path. And finally, the divergence in the civil-military perspectives about the intent and content of the Kerry-Lugar bill has generated a major debate in Pakistan about the nature of the U.S.-Pakistan relations. A trust deficit is unfortunately growing on both sides despite regular interaction between leaders of the two countries and public cooperation in counterterrorism field.
The complexity of the challenge at hand for both Pakistan and the U.S. is vividly apparent in this context. For the TTP and its associates, the GHQ attack will be deemed a successful operation, useful for attracting more recruits. But on the flip side, Pakistani public support for more effective counterterrorism measures will also increase. As most polls and surveys indicate, Pakistani support for effective action against TTP and other militant groups increased after the rise of violence in the Swat Valley area. So, the time is ripe to cleanse the FATA as well as parts of South Punjab where extremism is brewing. For this to happen, intelligence sharing between Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the civilian law enforcement agencies, especially the competently led Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and newly constituted National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA), will be critically valuable.
Indian political leadership, despite its reservations about the 2008 Mumbai attack investigation in Pakistan, can also help by fully reviving the peace process with Pakistan and by restraining itself from accusing Pakistan of blame for everything that negatively affects India. The Obama administration can lend a hand by convincing the U.S. Congress to reframe the few provisions of the recently passed aid bill that have become controversial in Pakistan. Pakistan’s politicians on their part can help the army’s counterterrorism resolve by standing together and developing consensus on major policy issues confronting the state.
The Pakistani Army’s track record is not enviable. Its disastrous interferences in political affairs and pursuance of illegitimate foreign policy goals through non-state actors cannot be justified on any grounds. Still, Pakistan needs a disciplined, cohesive and efficient army today more than ever before. Anything less than a full-on counterterrorism effort from the Pakistani military will attract more serious challenges tomorrow than those it confronted yesterday.
Author : Dr. Hassan is a Bernard Schwartz fellow at the Asia Society and senior advisor at the Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School. He is also the author of Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism.
