The inconclusive India-Pakistan talks on July 15th have caused a major disappointment in Pakistan. Most people hoped that, as India’s Foreign Minister was visiting Islamabad for the first time after the Mumbai terrorist incident, India must have made up its mind to resume some kind of dialogue on major contentious issues including terrorism.
These talks could not produce a positive result because India insisted on Pakistan satisfying its concerns with Pakistan’s connection with the Mumbai terrorist incident. In the press conference, India’s Foreign Minister accused the ISI of being involved in the attack. India did not want to talk on any contentious issue until Pakistan took action against the leadership of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. Pakistan suggested that a comprehensive dialogue be initiated on 8 major contentious issues including terrorism. These were the issues being discussed in the composite dialogue between India and Pakistan in 2004-2008. As the gap between the dispositions of the two delegations was so wide that they could not agree on a joint strategy for improvement of relations.
However, the two sides agreed to continue talking to each other. Any future talks are not going to produce any positive results if India did not show flexibility in its one item agenda for talking to Pakistan.
India’s posture runs counter to India’s agenda of neutralizing Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (Jamaatud Dawa). The continued deadlock in the talks and tension between India and Pakistan strengthen the position of Islamic and militant groups in Pakistan that have been arguing all the time that India is not interested in resolving contentious bilateral issues through dialogue. These groups flourish in an environment of tension and conflict between India and Pakistan. They cash on anti-India sentiments and endeavour to reinforce these sentiments.
It seems that India’s official circles are convinced that a heavy diplomatic pressure will compel Pakistan to give in to India’s demand. Further, the Indian leaders think that global sympathy for India on the Mumbai terrorist attack can be turned into additional pressure on Pakistan.
The United States and other Western countries sympathize with India on this issue and have suggested to Pakistan to proceed against militancy, especially Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. For the U.S., other Western countries and Saudi Arabia the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban are a greater threat than Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. Therefore there is a limit to what India can achieve against Pakistan through international diplomacy.
There is a need of understanding the terrorist threat to Pakistani state and society. The Pakistan’s security forces are fighting the Taliban and other militant elements in the tribal areas. Pakistan’s Army has lost more people in the on-going counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations than in the wars with India in 1965 and 1971. Improvement of relations between India and Pakistan can be a major good will gesture towards Pakistan’s struggle against terrorism.
The notion of the ISI orchestrating the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and other anti-India militant groups needs a reality check in 2010. Most the militant groups that were known for enjoying the patronage of Pakistani intelligence establishment have acquired more or less autonomous disposition. They do not always listen to their former patrons.
The major obstacle to a firm action against the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba is not necessarily its alleged role as a strategic asset for the future. Two major reasons explain its continued activism. First, it has developed strong societal roots by pursuing social welfare activities for the poor in the tradition of Hezbollah in South Lebanon. Second, the continued Indian demand to prosecute and convict the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba hierarchy helps it to earn respectability in Islamist and the Political-Right circles. The government of Pakistan does not want to be seen as proceeding against its top leadership under Indian pressure. Further, there is the problem of admissibility of Indian dossiers against the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba in Pakistani courts.
Instead of engaging in polemical exchanges at the official and non-official level, India and Pakistan will have to break out of the current stalemate that serves the interests of religious extremists and hard liners. They need to return to the dialogue table on the basis of a shared agenda rather than India imposing its single-item agenda as a pre-condition for normalization of relations.
Pakistan will be better placed to deal with the militant groups if India and Pakistan take measures to normalize their relations by addressing the issues that can be tackled easily. This should be accompanied by improved non-official interaction, release of prisoners and bilateral trade.
India cannot on its own tackle with the militant Islamic groups based in Pakistan. It needs to appreciate the challenges Pakistan faces from such groups and work along with Pakistan to address this menace. It will find a lot of support for this policy in Pakistan.
If the current civilian democratic arrangements collapses in Pakistan and religious extremists gain an upper hand, India will face a more problematic situation. Therefore, Indian policy makers and others need to think afresh on the post-Mumbai policy towards Pakistan. A change in India’s policy and resumption of the dialouge will be beneficial to both.
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